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Abstract
A mobilised citizenry is a threat to corrupt operations. Therefore, those involved in
behaviours potentially labelled as corrupt have an interest in minimising public
outrage. Five ways of doing this are to hide the activity, denigrate opponents,
reinterpret actions as legitimate, use official channels to give an appearance of justice,
and intimidate or bribe people involved. A local government scandal in Wollongong,
Australia, illustrates all these tactics, with public hearings and media coverage
providing volumes of revealing information. The implication of this analysis is that
anti-corruption efforts should emphasise ways of increasing public outrage.
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Introduction
“Sex and corruption” — it was a top news story. The opening day of the hearings, 18
February 2008, brought out sizzling details about Wollongong City Council, the local
government body for the city of Wollongong, south of Sydney. Beth Morgan had
worked for the council as a senior development officer with authority to approve
development applications. She approved several buildings that grossly violated
planning guidelines at the same time as having affairs with three different developers.
Morgan planned to leave the council and set up her own business and was establishing
a clientele. As well as sex, money played a major role. One of the developers, Frank
Vellar, plied Morgan with gifts.
The Independent Commission Against Corruption, a statutory body in the state
of New South Wales, had been tipped off about dodgy operations in Wollongong and
started an investigation in 2006 that included telephone taps, video surveillance and
seizure of computers to obtain e-mails. The opening statement at ICAC’s 2008
hearings used the information gathered to spell out a damning case of a prodevelopment government body that eased the path for developers with inside access.
There was more. Two men — referred to in the media as “conmen,” as they
had been to prison for fraud — posed as ICAC staff or as having influence with ICAC
and approached various developers, council staff and politicians soliciting bribes to
thwart the investigation. Morgan gave them $50,000, Vellar gave them at least
$100,000 — the two men obtained a total of half a million dollars.
The core feature of corruption revealed in the Wollongong scandal —
developers offering inducements (bribes) to local politicians and government officials
to obtain favours — is typical of local government corruption across Australia.
Sometimes the bribes take the form of donations to political parties or campaigns. The
Wollongong case, unlike others, was documented by an extended covert investigation
and received extensive local media coverage following public hearings.
Corruption is most commonly studied from the point of view of economics or
politics or both, with a focus on structures. In a market picture, the structures involve
either incentives for or deterrents to corruption; in a political-system picture, the
structures are laws, policies and systems of government. Researchers also debate
definitions, prevalence and consequences of corruption and ways to address it (Jain
2
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2001; Lambsdorff et al. 2005; Rose-Ackerman 1978, 1999). Here, I introduce a
different perspective, complementary to the usual structural approach.
One of the common questions by researchers and concerned citizens is why
corruption persists. In other words, if most people think corruption is wrong, how do
perpetrators get away with it? To tackle this question, I look at the tactics of outrage
management.
To call something corrupt is to label it as wrong or inappropriate. When an
activity is widely seen as wrong, perpetrators are at risk of being exposed,
condemned, shunned and prosecuted. In short, people are outraged. People who are
seriously concerned may decide to take action: to speak out, band together, call in
supporters, get authorities on side or take direct action. Popular outrage can be a
serious threat to perpetrators. To continue with their activity, they need to minimise
this sort of reaction. How can they do this?
Studies in a wide range of areas show that perpetrators commonly use five
sorts of methods to minimise public outrage (Martin 2007):
• cover up the activity
• devalue the target
• reinterpret the activity, including by lying, minimising consequences,
blaming others and reframing
• use official channels to give an appearance of justice
• intimidate and bribe people involved.
These are methods available to powerful perpetrators, for example bosses who bully
subordinates, managers who attack whistleblowers, police who beat citizens,
militaries that shoot civilian protesters, and governments that license torture.
However, sometimes these methods fail and the action backfires on the perpetrator.
Examples include the beating of Rodney King in 1991 that backfired on the Los
Angeles police (Martin 2005), the massacre of protesters in Dili, East Timor in 1991
that backfired on the Indonesian government (Martin 2007) and the 2003 invasion of
Iraq that backfired on the US government (Martin 2004). In each of these cases, the
perpetrators used all five methods listed above to inhibit adverse reactions, but —
unusually — the methods were not sufficient and massive public outrage ensued.

3
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Using this framework, the Wollongong scandal can be analysed as a case in
which corruption backfired. Beth Morgan, for example, instead of gaining clients for
her prospective business, lost her job, had her reputation destroyed and may be
subject to criminal charges. Local politicians named in the investigation were thrown
out of their offices and are likely to be unelectable in the future due to the adverse
publicity.
Cases in which injustice backfires are valuable for probing the mechanisms
normally used for inhibiting outrage. For example, a close study of the beating of
Rodney King reveals several methods that dampened public concern. Some of these
methods, notably cover-up and intimidation, are found in many other, lower-profile
police beatings; other methods used in the case, such as formal inquiries and court
cases, are unusual in police beatings (Martin 2005). In the King beating case, the
methods used by the police were insufficient to prevent a major public outcry, but that
is not the main point here. Because the case received saturation media coverage,
including books written by partisans on each side, there is far more documentation
about what happened than in a run-of-the-mill police beating. The same phenomenon
can be observed in other major backfires, such as the Dili massacre and the invasion
of Iraq.
The Wollongong corruption scandal has the same characteristics as other
backfires: it is atypical precisely because corruption was counterproductive for the
perpetrators, and the ICAC investigation and massive publicity made available
information about the dynamics of corruption that is normally hidden. The events in
Wollongong therefore provide a window into methods normally used to inhibit public
outrage over corruption.
Corruption can involve many different methods. For example, money
laundering, one process in some corrupt operations, involves portraying illegally
obtained funds as legal. My intention here is not to document a wide range of
practical techniques but rather to focus on dimensions that operate to inhibit public
outrage. Most of the techniques of money laundering fit into the category of cover-up;
the final destination of laundered money, an apparently legitimate business, might
also fit into the category of an official channel that gives only an appearance of
honesty. The techniques used in corrupt operations can vary quite a lot from situation
4
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to situation. The aim here is to note commonalities that arise through the goal or
outcome of inhibiting public concern.
This framework offers guidance for challenging corruption through increasing
public outrage. Each of the five methods of inhibiting outrage can be countered:
• expose the activity
• validate the targets and devalue the perpetrators
• interpret the activity as unfair
• mobilise public support; don’t rely on official channels
• resist and expose intimidation and bribery.
These are not the only methods for opposing corruption; there are also many
approaches to prevention such as design of financial systems. These five methods are
oriented to outrage dynamics.
In this paper, I address each of the five methods of inhibiting outrage over
corruption and corresponding methods of increasing outrage: cover-up versus
exposure; devaluation versus validation; interpretation struggles; official channels
versus public mobilisation; and intimidation and bribery versus resistance.
Concerning each method, I offer some general comments and then give examples
from the Wollongong corruption scandal, in the process gradually telling more about
the Wollongong case. In the conclusion, I summarise the value of focusing on outrage
management in studying and dealing with corruption.
In giving examples of tactics, I draw heavily on transcripts of ICAC’s public
hearings (ICAC 2008a), and newspaper reports of the hearings, especially in
Wollongong’s daily paper, the Illawarra Mercury. The 1000-page hearing transcripts
are a rich source of information but at the same time are limited in scope. A more
comprehensive investigation involving extensive interviews would undoubtedly
uncover far more information and give a more accurate picture of operations in
Wollongong, but much of such information could not be published because of
Australia’s restrictive defamation laws (Pullan 1994).
Before turning to methods of inhibiting outrage, I first give some background
information about Wollongong. This is not intended to be a full account of the
Wollongong corruption story, much less the wider history of Wollongong politics.
Instead, I use the Wollongong example to illustrate tactics of outrage management.
5
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Wollongong background
Wollongong is a city on the Pacific coast 80km south of Sydney. Its population of
280,000 makes it the third largest city in the state of New South Wales.
Australia is divided into local government areas called councils. Wollongong
Council is responsible for about two-thirds of the population of Wollongong; the
remaining third, in the south, is in the jurisdictions of Shellharbour Council and
Kiama Council.
Local governments have various responsibilities, from garbage collection to
library services. The key issue here is property development. A homeowner who
wants to build a house extension needs council approval. Special favours can be given
at this level: knowing the right person might help in gaining prompt approval. Another
possibility is that an outspoken resident might be targeted with extra scrutiny and
made to take down or rebuild constructions that are trivially in violation of guidelines.
In short, the power of approval is a possible avenue for corruption and abuse of
power.
In the Wollongong corruption scandal, the focus was on bigger fish: approvals
for major developments involving millions or tens of millions of dollars. Getting
approval in violation of guidelines can lead to windfall profits. Indeed, getting
approval at all can make the difference between a loss — the expenditure of
considerable time and money simply making the application — and a normal profit
margin.
Development applications — abbreviated DAs — are put to the council, where
planners check for compliance with rules and regulations. The planners are paid staff.
There is another layer to the approval process: the elected officials, known as
councillors. “Wollongong Council” can refer to the body of councillors or to the paid
staff, or both. Major DAs need approval by the councillors.
From 2004–8, Wollongong had 13 councillors, seven from the Labor Party and
six independents. Wollongong is the largest working-class city in Australia; its major
industry is Australia’s only integrated steelworks. The region has a long history of
support for the Labor Party and left-wing unionism. However, following the recession
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in the early 1980s, when the steelworks nearly closed, there has been a push for
tourism and property development to complement the region’s industrial base.
In New South Wales, Labor was in power from 1995 to 2011. Until the 2011
election, most state members of parliament from Wollongong were members of the
Australian Labor Party, something simply taken for granted because the seats are so
strongly Labor. State-level politics is relevant in a couple of ways: Wollongong
Council does not have full say over developments because state planning regulations
play a restraining role; and Wollongong members of state parliament can become
involved in local planning issues. Labor was also in power federally so, for
Wollongong residents, all three levels of government were Labor-controlled. For
reference purposes, Appendix 1 lists key figures in the scandal and Appendix 2 the
main sorts of corrupt or inappropriate conduct alleged to have occurred.
With this background, I now turn to methods by which corrupt operators can
minimise public concern about their activities, looking in turn at cover-up,
devaluation, reinterpretation, official channels and intimidation. In each section
devoted to one of these methods, I first outline some general features of the method
and then give illustrations from the Wollongong scandal. In each section I also discuss
ways of increasing public concern, namely through exposure, validation,
interpretation, civic mobilisation and resistance.

Cover-up versus exposure
Concealment is standard procedure for much crime and corruption. Things defined as
criminal are stigmatised, with penalties for transgressors, so it makes sense to avoid
detection. House thieves, for example, prefer to operate when no one is home and to
leave few clues about their identity. The importance of cover-up can be inferred from
the infrequency with which participants in potentially dubious activities are willing to
tell all and sundry. This point is obvious but warrants emphasis when it comes to
analysing outrage dynamics.
When activities are normalised, then concealment may no longer be necessary.
Taxation has sufficient legitimacy to be administered openly whereas illegal tax
avoidance is concealed (Levi 1988). A useful test of the legitimacy of practices is how
openly they are carried out. In some countries, paying officials to avoid prosecution is
7
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standard practice. If such behaviour is to be labelled corrupt, then it is suitably called
institutionalised corruption.
Cover-up is commonly selective: some people know what is going on but
activities are concealed from wider audiences. For example, operators of cartels know
what they are doing but this is not advertised to consumers. In many cases, members
of the public may know in general terms that corruption occurs but seldom have it
thrust in their faces. Vivid personal experience is more likely to cause outrage and
generate active opposition to criminal activities.
Now consider the role of cover-up in the Wollongong saga. The key corrupt
activity was collusion between developers and city officials to give special treatment
to the applications by selected developers in exchange for cash or other perquisites.
Beth Morgan knew about her own affairs with developers, obviously enough. Some of
her co-workers knew or suspected. But few outsiders knew anything.
While information was kept away from wider audiences, insiders obtained
extra information. For example, Morgan released confidential council documents to
developers.
Many people in Wollongong, especially those concerned about the impacts of
local development on environmental and social amenity, believed corruption existed
— this is a well-known problem in Australia — but few would have had any detailed
information. According to a newspaper story, “One former colleague [of Morgan’s]
said ‘everyone’ knew things were bad but the extent of the bribery and corruption
claims were a shock, even to them.” (Carty and Trenwith 2008). The result of coverup was a layered access to knowledge: those directly involved were fully aware of
their activities, some close at hand knew there were problems but did not have details,
some citizens had generalised concerns and many others were blissfully ignorant. A
few individuals obtained specific knowledge via leaks from insiders to the media and
community members.
This sort of layered knowledge, and a corresponding layered ignorance, is
likely to be found in other forms of corruption. The importance of restricting
awareness of corrupt activities is that it limits the possibility of a mobilised
opposition. Those who are personally involved are unlikely to speak out; those who
are not involved but close at hand, such as Morgan’s co-workers, may be silenced
8
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through other techniques, as discussed later; and those more removed do not have
enough information to act upon. The wider public is unlikely to become very
concerned, at least not enough to interrupt the corrupt activities.
The ICAC hearings revealed some details about techniques of cover-up.
• When council general manager Rod Oxley met with developers, no file notes
were made (43). (Numbers in brackets refer to page numbers in transcripts of the
ICAC hearings (ICAC 2008a).)
• Morgan did not disclose any gifts she received from developers, despite a
council policy requiring disclosure (52).
• Morgan, handling a major DA by Glen Tabak, managed to get it approved
without going through wider scrutiny by councillors that is mandated when a
development is a matter of “community interest.” She phoned Tabak about this and
said “Glen, it went under the radar in terms of community interest hence was able to
be dealt with swiftly and without interference.” This call was recorded by ICAC
investigators. ICAC lawyer Noel Hemmings, questioning Morgan, asked “That’s why
you handled the application in the way you did, isn’t it?” She answered yes.
Hemmings then asked “You wanted it to go under the radar so the community
wouldn’t know what was going on?” She replied that there appeared to be little
“community interest compared to the size of the application” (53).
• Documents about the Quattro development were missing (107).
• Morgan disguised her role by using a co-worker’s computer to register her
approval of a DA (112).
• Morgan emailed Vellar confidential council documents as a blind copy
recipient, preventing the named recipients from knowing he received them (220).
• Councillor Val Zanotto sent emails to Vellar under the name “Franco
Magnagotti” (220). Whatever the justification, this reduced the possibility of outsiders
seeing their connection. Zanotto said to Vellar that he had to be careful in his
conversations with him (670–671). Vellar’s name was recorded as Gato.
• Zanotto, in a Council meeting, led the argument in favour of one of Vellar’s
developments without revealing his relationship with Vellar (676).

9
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• Vellar requested that Morgan be removed from assessing a DA — the
Bathers’ Pavillion — to avoid his connection with her being revealed (McInerney
2008, 21 February: 4).
• When manager Joe Scimone left his job at the Council, he signed a
confidentiality agreement, which served to keep details out of the public eye (531).
• When Scimone gave $30,000 to Younan, he left the money on the seat of
Younan’s car (911). If their meeting was being filmed, this eliminated a more obvious
handover of the money.
These examples show that cover-up can occur in many different ways and be
oriented to different audiences. Some individuals hid or disguised their activities —
meetings with developers or the identity of people they called — to reduce awareness
of their personal involvement. In other cases, the main target was the wider
community, as in Morgan’s successful effort to avoid Tabak’s DA having to receive
scrutiny as a matter of community interest.

The counter-tactic to cover-up is exposure. So how can corruption be exposed?
Usually there are quite a few people who know about it, but the closer they are to the
centre of the operations, the less likely they are to challenge it. Occasionally a key
player turns informant; such a super-grass can be a powerful tool against corrupt
operations. More commonly though, exposure involves a parallel layered process,
with a few who are closer to the action revealing some of what’s happening to a
slightly wider group, some of whom take it more widely still. If enough credible
sources are available, media may take up the story, publicising the matter widely. This
general process is sometimes short-circuited via a deep exposure from a high-level
informant or a probing investigation.
In Wollongong, the process of exposure involved both residents and ICAC.
Over the years, residents had made many submissions to ICAC requesting
investigations into council activities, so ICAC officials should have known about
corrupt conduct in Wollongong. Though the specific trigger is not publicly known,
ICAC initiated a covert investigation, including phone taps and, later, seizure of
computers to obtain e-mails, collecting a mass of damning information. ICAC then
prepared for a series of public hearings at which key figures — especially the so10
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called “people of interest,” namely those suspected of serious corruption — were
compelled to testify. Some of them started off by lying, attempting to hide their
involvement by denying it, but ICAC investigators then brought out damning
information exposing these lies, encouraging some of those testifying to admit to
some of their activities.
The ICAC hearings were public, making them ideal for media stories. There
were headlines and follow-up stories in the main local newspaper, the Illawarra
Mercury, day after day. Closed hearings and a confidential report would have limited
public outrage. ICAC’s open hearings, with transcripts and reports published on the
web, maximised public impact.
Several possible methods of exposure were not prominent in the Wollongong
case. No high-level insider went public about corruption: there were no
whistleblowers who went directly to the media. (The one partial exception was
council employee Vicki Curran who complained about sexual harassment from
manager Joe Scimone. Her complaints helped lead to creation of the citizens’ group
Wollongong Against Corruption, discussed later.)
Normal management processes did not address the problems: in many
respects, they were part of the problem. Investigative journalists were not the primary
instigators of exposure. The Wollongong case thus does not reveal all possible means
of exposure: it simply shows one actual means — an external investigation, public
hearings and media coverage — and, more importantly, the importance of exposing
corruption to the public as a means of creating outrage and challenging the corrupt
processes.
In summary, cover-up is a crucial method used to inhibit outrage about crime
and corruption. Cover-up is layered: some people know a lot about operations,
whereas large numbers know little or nothing. Successful corruption relies on a
disjunction between knowledge, concern and willingness to act. Those closest to the
action are typically part of the corruption, compromised or fearful; those furthest from
the action typically do not know enough to become concerned or take effective action.

11
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Devaluation and validation
The status of a victim affects how people feel about an action. People think murder is
bad in the abstract; in practice, they usually care more about the murder of a respected
surgeon than of a serial killer. Devaluing the target therefore is a powerful way of
reducing concern about actions taken. Devaluation can occur through prior prejudice
such as racism or by active measures including labelling, malicious rumours and
frame-ups.
Powerful groups have the greatest capacity to devalue others: governments can
label someone a terrorist; police can charge people with crimes; a boss can make
demeaning comments about subordinates.
The question then arises: do corrupt operators have the capacity to devalue
others? With institutionalised corruption, the answer is yes, because powerful groups
are complicit. With petty corruption, the answer is usually no. In intermediate
situations, corrupt operators and their allies have a significant but restricted capacity
for devaluation, for example limited to particular individuals.
In Wollongong, there were two main types of devaluation. The first was close
at hand, within the council: when planners made recommendations against
developments but Oxley applied pressure to find a way to approve them, this could be
taken as an implicit devaluation of the planners’ expertise.
The second form of devaluation arose out of the pro-development ideology
promoted by key politicians and council officials. In 2004, a story in the Illawarra
Mercury began “Wollongong City Council general manager Rod Oxley has blasted
the performance of planning staff in dealing with development applications.” The
article quoted Oxley as saying “It’s about time these professional planners acted
professionally … they are not operating as effectively and efficiently as they should
be. It’s been going on for far too long.” (Anon 2004). This was a remarkable public
attack by a manager on his subordinates. The context was public criticism of Oxley by
a community activist based on memos and emails from Oxley urging approval of a
particular development (Field 2004).
Devaluation occurred in the same sort of layered approach as with cover-up.
Closest to corrupt operations was where the most serious and effective forms of
devaluation could occur, targeted at individuals. Further out, devaluation mainly took
12
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the form of labelling as anti-development those who were critical of specific
developments or who expected greater citizen participation in decision-making.
As a general rule, when opponents of corruption are specific targets of overt
techniques of devaluation, it is likely that corruption is entrenched. This is opposite to
the pattern for cover-up: institutionalised corruption is characterised by less cover-up
and more overt devaluation.
The corruption in Wollongong was mostly covert, so opportunities for
devaluation of corruption opponents was limited. At the ICAC hearings, there is little
evidence of devaluation, probably because those being questioned were under
scrutiny: they were hardly in a position to launch attacks on the character of their
accusers. One incident in the hearings illustrates how devaluation can operate. Most
of those called to testify were represented by lawyers, and the lawyers were given an
opportunity to cross-examine witnesses. Oxley’s lawyer, in questioning David Broyd
— the council planner who tried to resist pressures from Oxley and whose testimony
was damaging to Oxley — tried to discredit Broyd by referring to a DA that Broyd
had approved, apparently against the guidelines (572ff). If Broyd could be shown to
have sanctioned violation of guidelines, even on a minor matter, then his claims
against Oxley would lose force — at least that is the process by which devaluation
tends to operate.
The counter to devaluation is validating those opposed to corruption. The
more that opponents are perceived as honest, interested primarily in the public good,
esteemed for their achievements and seen as peers, the more credibility they are likely
to have and the harder it will be to devalue them. A whistleblower, for example, will
have greater credibility by dressing conservatively, speaking in a calm and dignified
fashion and not appearing to seek personal advantage or vengeance.
In Wollongong, it is hard to see how validation processes played out inside
council — the evidence is not available. In the public arena, anti-corruption citizen
groups gained credibility through having participants from different political parties
and occupations, showing that they were not partisan enterprises, as discussed later.
For opponents of corruption, it is important to involve individuals who are
well regarded and free of taint, especially as spokespeople. If challengers can be
tarred with even minor misdemeanours, it greatly damages their credibility, under the
13
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common but mistaken assumption that only honest people have the right to challenge
dishonesty. The reputations of challengers therefore become prime targets for attack,
which often occurs via rumours, anonymous letters and emails, and information
leaked to the media.

Interpretation struggles
Actions do not come with labels such as “corrupt” or “honest” but instead have to be
interpreted. What counts as crime and corruption is subject to interpretation at
individual and collective levels.
There are many techniques for explaining behaviour that might be labelled
corrupt. Four important techniques for minimising concern and outrage are lying,
minimising, blaming and framing.
Lying is the most obvious way to change someone’s view of a situation. Lying,
as defined by researchers, includes both telling falsehoods and withholding the truth
(Ekman 2001). However, many people believe that withholding the truth is not lying,
so they are careful to avoid overt falsehoods even as they are quite deceptive by not
expressing what they know.
Lying — especially lying by omission — is a means of cover-up. But if
someone knows that something has happened, lying gives a particular take on what
happened. For example, when Morgan did not reveal her relationships with
developers, this was cover-up; when Morgan’s colleague Ron Zwicker challenged her
about having an affair with Vellar, she denied it — she told a falsehood (73).
Developer Glen Tabak paid for plastering work on Morgan’s unit. Morgan
wrote him a cheque in payment and he gave her cash, thereby making the gift appear
to be a business transaction: “Glen wanted me to write a cheque in case anybody
asked to make it look legitimate” (65).
Testimony at ICAC hearings provides a rich lode of material about lying — or
suspected lying. In many cases, conclusive proof about events was not available, but
patterns and circumstantial evidence made claims by witnesses dubious.
There was an extra dimension at the hearings: perjury. Witnesses had to swear
to tell the truth and were compelled to answer questions, though self-incriminating
responses under such conditions could not be used in subsequent court cases.
14
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However, lying at the hearings was a crime and, in principle, could be prosecuted.
Here are some examples concerning (alleged) lying.
• Oxley denied any involvement in a particular DA. This was false according
to Morgan (116).
• Morgan admitted lying to ICAC in questioning prior to the hearings
(163-165).
• In one of Vellar’s phone conversations intercepted by ICAC, he said Oxley
“should be put away.” However, he denied he had meant Oxley could go to jail for
corruption (263–264).
• Vellar denied asking for approval of his DA via planner John Gilbert. It is
worth expanding on this example to show the challenge in pinning down an alleged
lie.
In the ICAC hearings, Noel Hemmings asked Vellar “Had you asked Mr
Gilbert to have his computer used to record the consent so that Ms Morgan’s name
would not appear on it?” Vellar answered “No, I did not.” Hemmings, to limit Vellar’s
room to manoeuvre, asked “Did you have a conversation on that line?” Vellar: “No I
did not” (206).
At this point a recording was played of a conversation between Gilbert,
Morgan and Vellar. Hemmings then asked “I asked you questions as to whether you
had made any application to Mr Gilbert or Mr Oxley that the application be signed by
him and not Ms Morgan. Do you recall that?” Vellar: “Yes.” Hemmings: “And you
denied it?” Vellar: “Because I did not recollect what you had asked me.” Hemmings:
“You didn’t recollect?” Vellar: “You had asked me, I believe a question that I did not
understand correctly. By playing the tape I have heard now what you were asking
me.” (207) Vellar has avoided admitting to a lie.
A bit later, Hemmings asked, “Were you concerned about the possible linking
of Beth Morgan with the Quattro application?” Vellar: “I was concerned that not the
linking [sic], but I wanted her superior to look over the application.” Hemmings: “You
wanted her name not to appear?” Vellar: “No, I wanted her superior to look over the
application.”
At this point the ICAC Commissioner, Jerrold Cripps, asked “Why did it have
to be signed by him, why couldn’t she sign it if that’s all you were worried about?”
15
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Vellar: “I didn’t — I didn’t want the relationship between Beth and I to interfere with
this application.”
Hemmings leaped on this admission: “But you knew it had interfered with this
application?” “The relationship?” “Yes?” “I guess so.” Hemmings: “You guess so,
you knew so. She was doing favours for you, was she not?” Vellar: “No, she was not
doing favours for me” (208). This was all Hemmings needed on this point.
This interchange illustrates how a witness can wriggle out of an open
admission of lying. Vellar first denied a conversation, then claimed he hadn’t
understood the question, then claimed he asked that Gilbert sign the application
because Vellar just wanted him to read it, and finally indirectly admitted that his
relationship with Morgan, if known, might hurt the application — but denied Morgan
was doing him favours. For Hemmings, Vellar was a moving target, changing his
explanations along the way.
The interchange also illustrates the power of evidence — in this case
intercepted telephone calls — in challenging lies and forcing witnesses into
admissions. Here I’ve quoted only a small portion of the testimony on this point. The
interchange illustrates how hard it is to pin witnesses down and hence the enormous
effort required by ICAC questioners to gain traction on even a small point on which
evidence obtained by ICAC — recordings of telephone conversations — appears
conclusive. If it is this difficult to obtain admissions when there is damning evidence
and the threat of a perjury charge, the ease of face-saving lies and omissions on other
occasions can be imagined.
Sometimes the ICAC questioners directly accused witnesses of lying, but
witnesses often persisted in their claims although the evidence of deceit seemed
overwhelming. For example, when Tabak said he never discussed DAs at the Table of
Knowledge — the colloquial term for an outdoor table at a local kebab shop where
developers regularly met, sometimes joined by council staff — Hemmings said this
was a lie, but Tabak denied it was (272–273). Gerald Carroll denied extorting money,
instead saying that he and Younan were helping Vellar and Morgan with legal referrals
and that Younan had manipulated him (932). After an intercepted telephone
conversation was played, Carroll said it could be interpreted as bribery, but it wasn’t
(935). Hemmings eventually accused Carroll of telling “a pack of lies” and
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Commissioner Cripps made equivalent accusations (941, 942; Trenwith 2008: 5
March).
Despite intense questioning, witnesses only rarely admitted to lying. Morgan
(165) and Tabak (328) are two who did. The more common approach was to deny
allegations, as suggested by advice given by Scimone in an email produced by ICAC:
“deny, deny, deny” (Trenwith 2008: 27 February).
Another approach is to deny understanding of what is going on. Developer
Glen Tabak appeared to use this approach, though it is impossible to know whether he
was lying or simply ignorant. He said that when he was having an affair with Beth
Morgan, he didn’t know she was the assessment officer for his DA (291). She said he
gave her cash; he denied it (294). He denied knowing the meaning of “community
consultation” or what Morgan meant by saying his DA had gone “under the radar” to
avoid a community consultation (298–299). He said he didn’t know why Morgan was
sending him emails (302). And he said he was unaware of a $750,000 payment
suddenly required in relation to one of his properties (307–308). In the Illawarra
Mercury, journalist Paul McInerney wrote that “For a man who has poured millions of
dollars into building projects in Wollongong, developer Glen Tabak has a lamentably
poor grasp of the planning system. And a memory that at times threatened the
patience of ICAC commissioner Jerrold Cripps and his senior counsel Noel
Hemmings” (McInerney 2008: 22 February).
Vellar, in his first round of testimony, seldom claimed he couldn’t remember
things. However, in a later appearance, he said he didn’t remember his affair with
Morgan occurring at a particular time even when prompted by presentation of
Morgan’s emails at the time (598–599). He received confidential rezoning
information but said he couldn’t recall who gave it to him (612). He said he didn’t
know why he had said, in an intercepted message, that he had been tipped off — even
after being warned about lying (617).
Councillor Val Zanotto also claimed ignorance. In a call to Vellar, Zanotto said
he (Zanotto) had to be careful but claimed he didn’t know why he said it (670–671).
Minimising the consequences is another method of interpretation. Roy
Baumeister (1997) studied ways of thinking by perpetrators of horrific crimes and
found that they nearly always considered the impact of their actions on victims was
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far less than what the victims themselves felt. So when perpetrators minimise the
consequences, they can be sincere.
Scimone said he didn’t mention his friendship with developer Tabak because it
wasn’t “material to the discussion” (896). Councillor Kiril Jonovski initially denied
meeting Vellar in October 2006. When evidence of his knowledge of the meeting was
presented, he said he didn’t recall it because it was a “non-event” (855). It is
reasonable to presume that those involved in corruption commonly rationalise their
behaviour, to themselves, by perceiving the impacts on others as minimal or deserved
(Bandura 1986: 375–389).
Blaming others is a useful way to deflect outrage. Powerful perpetrators find it
useful when bit players are targeted for opprobrium. Drug syndicates are not seriously
damaged by arrest and prosecution of users or local suppliers: the attention is focused
away from the main players.
Morgan said “because of the city centre revitalization policy we were told not
to use the policy” — and said it was “Managers at Council” who told her that (38).
She also said concerning General Manager Rod Oxley that development approvals
were not made according to regulations but instead according to “Whatever Rod
wanted” (76).
ICAC in its investigation identified a number of “people of interest,” namely
those suspected of involvement in corruption. In its final report, it recommended
prosecution of specific individuals such as Beth Morgan and Frank Vellar. All those
named in this way were local politicians, council officials or developers. Yet there
were connections to state politics. For example, media stories exposed Noreen Hay, a
member of state parliament representing Wollongong. However, ICAC declined to
name her as a person of interest. ICAC’s approach of singling out local individuals
had the effect of blaming them for problems while leaving more powerful politicians
at the state level out of the picture.
Framing is looking at the world through a lens or perspective. Participants in
operations have much to gain by framing their activities as normal rather than corrupt.
Beth Morgan gave a number of reasons why she approved applications that
violated Council guidelines, including that unlawful approvals were okay because
making similar approvals “had been done before and nothing had ever been said about
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it” (58) and that the policies were going to change (75). She said Frank Vellar wanted
her as the assessment officer for his applications because he thought she was a good
planner (71). It was only under relentless questioning that she retreated from these
rationalisations and admitted she shouldn’t have approved the developments.
Those who say it is okay for property developers to have special connections
with local government officials — for example by making donations to politicians —
have framed the issue in a manner helpful to corrupt dealings.
Interpretation is carried out principally through language, so it is useful to look
at words used. The words “gift” and “donation” have favourable connotations; to call
the same action a “bribe” implies corruption. Those testifying before ICAC used a
variety of words to give a softer, more favourable interpretation of their actions.
Vellar gave Morgan a trip to a ski resort. He said the trip was “recreational,”
not a reward for approving his DA (198–199; McInerney 2008, 21 February: 3). He
said he gave Morgan cash “because she was destitute” (200). He said a false statement
by him was an “error” (258). When Zanotto gave him $150,000, Vellar called this a
“loan” (259; Cox 2008, 21 February). Deceptive framing can be thought of as a
method of lying; distinguishing between framing and lying in part depends on an
assessment of intention, which may be unknowable.
ICAC’s perspective was that it was improper for developers to exert influence
over the assessment of their DAs. This was why Morgan’s relationships with
developers were seen as so damning. Vellar had a different perspective: he said he was
entitled to express an opinion about who assessed his DAs (212–213). “Expressing an
opinion” frames the intervention quite differently from “exerting influence.”
Oxley, presented with a statement he had made to Vellar, interpreted it as
meaning something different from the words — namely his intent in using the words
(502–503). Oxley said his private meetings with Vellar were about ongoing
development in Wollongong, not about Vellar’s Quattro development (514). (For
Oxley’s perspective on the corruption scandal, see East (2009).)
Joe Scimone paid Younan $30,000. He preferred not to call this bribery but
rather “stupidity” (910; Trenwith 2008, 4 March).
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Opponents of corruption need to counter corruption-friendly interpretations and
emphasise their own. That means exposing lies and presenting the truth, explaining
the consequences of corruption behaviour, pinpointing those most responsible, and
using frameworks and language that highlight problems.
In Wollongong, the ICAC inquiry, media coverage and citizen action led to a
change of interpretation, from a development frame to a corruption frame. The
development frame looked at local planning issues through the lens of what was good
for development, “good” meaning what helped new projects obtain approval. The
emphasis was on outcomes — buildings built. The corruption frame looked instead at
the process, especially at who was involved in decision-making and whether the
process served private rather than the public interest.
I have described four interpretation techniques — lying, minimising, blaming
and framing — that can be used to reduce concern about corruption. These techniques
affect those who use them by explaining actions in legitimate or justifiable terms. The
power of these techniques was revealed by the persistence with which those testifying
before ICAC stuck to their own way of seeing the world despite striking evidence
showing the inappropriateness of their actions. Interpretation techniques can also
affect others: framing actions as acceptable makes it much harder to challenge them.
The implication is straightforward: opponents of corruption need to expose lies, show
the serious impacts of corrupt behaviour, pin responsibility on those centrally
involved, and shift to a frame of honesty versus corruption.

Official channels
Official channels include complaint and grievance procedures, ad hoc inquiries,
expert panels, ombudsmen, auditor-generals, anti-corruption commissions, courts —
any formal process that promises to address an organisational or social problem. In an
ideal world, official channels work, so referring a problem to one or more of them is
the best way to deal with it. However, in practice, when perpetrators are powerful,
official channels often give only an appearance of justice without the substance.
Whistleblowers commonly make reports to watchdog agencies in the
expectation that their matter will be dealt with effectively, but in practice this happens
all too infrequently (De Maria 1999; Devine 2004; Martin 2003). Even the most
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committed agencies have inadequate resources combined with onerous reporting
requirements, which mean they can deal with only a fraction of potential problems.
Furthermore, formal processes usually take a long time and remove matters from the
public gaze, causing outrage to decline.
When governments are themselves criminal or corrupt, they can use official
channels to maximum effect, giving the appearance of concern and action while
dampening public reactions. After the Sharpeville massacre in 1960, when white
police killed about a hundred black protesters, the South African government set up an
inquiry that largely exonerated the police (Frankel 2001). After the Dili massacre in
1991, when hundreds of East Timorese protesters were killed, the Indonesian military
and government each set up inquiries that imposed token penalties on a few soldiers
(Kohen 1999: 170–172). After the exposure of torture at Abu Ghraib prison in 2004,
the US government charged quite a few soldiers with crimes, but no higher officials
were indicted, there were no independent inquiries, no war crimes charges and no
hearings on television (Gray and Martin 2007).
When criminals do not run the government, they have a more difficult time
using official channels to their advantage. Nevertheless, this can still happen when
government bodies have little incentive to tackle the problems vigorously, which may
be due to criminal influence at higher levels, worries about possible pay-backs or fear
of bad publicity. In such circumstances, formal investigations and procedures may
give the appearance of official concern while limiting popular mobilisation against
corrupt activities. Official processes are usually slow, procedural and complex,
discouraging public interest and involvement.
Whether official channels provide a solution to corruption problems or operate
to minimise public outrage — or both — is an empirical issue: each case needs to be
examined. Generally speaking, the more systematic, organised and entrenched the
corruption, the less likely official channels are to be effective. The point here is that
official channels should not automatically be assumed to provide the solution.
The Wollongong case illustrates both the strengths and weaknesses of official
channels. Conventional processes within council were shown to be inadequate or
compromised. For example, complaints about Morgan’s relationships with developers
were ignored: John Gilbert, Morgan’s superior, did nothing about two separate
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complaints (474, 475). Morgan herself ran ethics programmes for other staff while
Zanotto, a councillor named by ICAC, was chair of the Audit and Governance
Committee for the council’s code of conduct. When Oxley resigned, one of the
conditions he requested and obtained was that council pay for his legal assistance at
the ICAC hearings. Meanwhile, the council abolished neighbourhood committees, an
avenue for community involvement. It was the failure of regular anti-corruption
processes that justified ICAC’s intervention.
On the surface, the Wollongong investigation would seem to be a triumph of
ICAC, the epitome of an anti-corruption official channel. Indeed it must be seen as
one of ICAC’s greatest successes, not only exposing corruption in Wollongong but
also in raising awareness of local government corruption more widely.
The impact of the ICAC investigation was due to two main factors: ICAC’s
careful covert collection of data and extensive media coverage, abetted by the
salacious facets of the case. ICAC’s decision to hold open hearings and to publish
transcripts and reports helped transform what might otherwise have been a low-key
operation into a popular sensation. The public exposures led people to speak out about
other problems and a receptive media to report them, for example about Labor Party
branch-stacking in Wollongong (Besser 2008).
Rodney Tiffen (1999), in his study of major investigative inquiries and
commissions in Australia, found that those with the greatest reform impact used the
media as a form of rolling exposé to amplify the impact of investigatory disclosures.
ICAC’s Wollongong inquiry fits this model. But only a few inquiries proceed this
way; most have little public impact, serving more to dampen than ignite public
concern.
The publicity about corruption in Wollongong stimulated the council — in its
final days before being dismissed — to reverse previous decisions. It revoked the
agreement to pay Oxley’s legal fees, dismissed Zanotto as chair of the Audit and
Governance Committee and set up a new ethics committee (Cox 2008, 4 March). It
also moved to reinstate neighbourhood committees, although this did not happen
under the administrators who took over from the elected councillors.
However, ICAC’s investigation had limits. Its probe into local government
corruption revealed links to actions by state parliamentarians and leading figures in
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the Labor Party. Joe Scimone worked at Wollongong Council, eventually on a high
salary of $168,000 as sustainability officer. Complaints were made against him for
sexual harassment. Gilbert received complaints about Scimone, which he dealt with
by talking to Scimone (486). Despite this, Council manager Rod Oxley gave Scimone
a glowing reference for a new job. Scimone obtained a $200,000 post in the Maritime
Authority, overseen by a member of state cabinet, Joe Tripodi, a well-known Labor
Party figure commonly called a powerbroker, and a long-time friend of Scimone’s.
Tripodi claimed he was not involved in the decision to hire Scimone at the Maritime
Authority. ICAC decided this was not a matter for investigation. (Scimone was later
dismissed from the Maritime Authority.)
The process for prosecuting individuals involved in corrupt conduct was very
slow. It was well over a year after the February 2008 hearings before ICAC gave
briefs of evidence to the Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP) to consider. A
newspaper report stated, “If charges are laid and individuals fight the charges, the
court battles could stretch out for years” (Roderick 2009). As of July 2010, only five
individuals had been tried, with the DPP still considering whether to lay charges
against six others, including Morgan, Vellar and Scimone (Roderick 2010). As of
April 2011, Morgan and Scimone were still to be charged (Tonkin 2011, 16 April).
ICAC’s targets were at the local government level, in Wollongong. Whenever
the links spilled into state-level politics, ICAC seemed to pull back. Its decisions not
to investigate individuals were taken as giving the all-clear for those individuals. For
example, following revelations that Noreen Hay, member of state parliament for
Wollongong, had connections with Vellar, the premier Morris Iemma stood her down
from her position as Parliamentary Secretary for Health; after ICAC said she was not
a person of interest, the premier reinstated her (Allely 2008; see also Christodoulou
2008, 25 July). Politicians and the media frequently interpreted ICAC saying someone
was not a person of interest as meaning ICAC had cleared them (e.g., Cox 2008, 30
July); ICAC’s contrary interpretation — saying someone was not an “affected person”
in relation to the Wollongong inquiry was not equivalent to clearing them — was only
occasionally reported (Christodoulou 2008, 31 July).
Others expressed concern about ICAC’s fixation on low-level corruption.
Quentin Dempster, a journalist for ABC television with a long-term interest in
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corruption (Dempster 1997), was quoted as saying about ICAC, “After Wollongong
council corruption was exposed, everyone wants to know why it has not been
pursuing the evidentiary trail up to Macquarie Street [New South Wales state
government] to determine if the slush-funding of the NSW branch of the Labor Party
by property developers and other vested interests represents serious and systemic
corrupt conduct” (Denholm and Salusinszky 2008). Subsequent media investigations
revealed links between developers and the Labor Party going much further than
Wollongong (Frew et al. 2008). Many commentators painted the state Labor
government as both incompetent and corrupt (Birmingham 2009–10).
Furthermore, even ICAC’s commitment to exposing corruption in Wollongong
was questioned. Councillor Andrew Anthony revealed that he had made several
complaints to ICAC years before, but had been fobbed off (McInerney 2008, 7
March). Michael Organ, formerly a federal member of parliament for an electorate in
Wollongong, wrote, “Many in the community have known about council corruption
for years but their concerns have been largely ignored by the council, politicians and
authorities such as the NSW Ombudsman’s office and ICAC” (Organ 2008).
The Wollongong exposé led to calls to ban political donations. In March 2008,
state premier Morris Iemma promised to reform the system of political donations
(Clennell 2008, 22 March). But little of substance came from this and later
pronouncements: months later, the state government retreated from Iemma’s promise
(Clennell 2008, 7 November; Smith 2008). The promises seemed intended to calm
public concern: the problem would seem less urgent if politicians were going to do
something about it. This illustrates a typical weakness of official channels: they
appear to be responding to problems when actually little happens. In other words, they
may be more show than substance.
Elections for local government offices were scheduled for September 2008. In
the wake of the revelations about corruption in the Labor Party, with four councillors
named by ICAC and extensive media coverage about dubious dealings by other Labor
Party figures, it seemed likely Labor would lose the Wollongong elections. ICAC,
however, recommended that the entire elected council be dissolved and replaced by
administrators — and this is exactly what the state Labor government did. The four
Labor councillors who were named by ICAC lost their positions, but so did all other
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nine councillors, including those without taint. The official response to exposures of
corruption in the Labor Party thus limited the damage to Labor in Wollongong. The
administrators were appointed to run council until the next scheduled elections after
2008.
Information about corruption in Wollongong stimulated the creation of two
citizens’ groups. These groups can be considered alternatives to official channels: they
each promoted citizen participation in decision-making, both as a means of limiting
corruption and as an end in itself, as a desirable facet of democracy.
Reclaim Our City (ROC) is an action and lobbying group made up of a variety
of individuals from trade unions, resident groups, indigenous and other communities.
It sees itself as an umbrella organisation, with participants representing diverse
constituencies. ROC’s first major event was a public meeting on 8 April 2008, not
long after the ICAC hearings concluded. The notice for the meeting stated “If you
want to have your say and join with other members of the community to demand a
new direction for our city, one that respects our natural and cultural heritage, that is
free of corruption and acts in the best interests of the residents, come along to this
meeting and join the campaign.” From this statement, it is clear that ROC has broader
aims than just anti-corruption: it is concerned with citizen empowerment as a means
to limit corruption but more widely to make citizens players in local decision-making.
ROC has three stated principles: to have an elected local government with
anti-corruption processes, to reconstitute neighbourhood committees recognised by
local government, and to promote appropriate development for the community, not
just developers. The group took up several issues. One was a plan for developing
Wollongong Harbour, being promoted by the state government. ROC demanded
genuine citizen participation in the decision-making process, challenging the state
government over an invitation for tenders and the likelihood of a facade of
consultation. ROC’s Hands Off the Harbour campaign involved writing letters to
politicians, making submissions to Wollongong Council, organising a petition,
running a newspaper advertisement, and organising a public meeting. Another issue
was Wollongong Town Hall: ROC joined other groups in opposing its demolition.
ROC also put effort into promoting neighbourhood committees, pushing to
have the council reconstitute them and provide funding to support them. A key
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demand was that neighbourhood committees should see all DAs in their area before
approval, as had been the practice in the past.
ROC’s initiatives provided a challenge to corruption in a way quite different
from ICAC. Rather than rely on formal processes, ROC’s approach is to make citizens
more aware and involved. This is a challenge to secrecy and insider operations in
which corruption flourishes. ROC’s Hands Off the Harbour campaign sought to
institute citizen scrutiny into a development process that restricted participation to
developers and government departments. The harbour is an emotive issue for many
people in Wollongong and thus an ideal issue for mobilising popular concern.
The second group was Wollongong Against Corruption (WAC). It was formed
prior to the ICAC hearings due to concern about corruption in the development
process and, more specifically, the way harassment complaints against a leading
Labor figure in Wollongong Council — Joe Scimone — had been dealt with. The
hearings led to a surge of involvement in WAC.
WAC’s goals are set out in the “Wollongong Charter for Ethics and Good
Governance,” with five principles: “decentralised decision making; community
participation in decision making processes; transparency of process; accountability of
officials; effective and accessible appeals processes.” The thrust of the charter is to
involve residents in local decision-making, including about planning, as an end in
itself and as a way of controlling corruption.
WAC’s activities have a fair bit in common with ROC’s: holding meetings,
making submissions, campaigning on particular development issues, and organising
demonstrations. WAC, like ROC, is concerned with corruption but has a much wider
brief: promoting a more participatory politics in Wollongong, with citizens involved
in decision-making in a more direct fashion than just as voters.
Compared to ROC, WAC’s style has been somewhat more strident, with its
demands articulated prominently in the public domain. On 1 April 2008 — though not
as an April Fool’s joke — WAC organised a “Freedom Train and People’s
Delegation,” with participants taking the train to Sydney and joining a protest outside
NSW state parliament. On 13 September 2008, when local government elections were
held across the state, but not in Wollongong, WAC organised a march and rally in
downtown Wollongong and a mock ballot with the choices being corruption or
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democracy (Apap 2008, 15 September). The theme of democracy denied was
prominent in speeches on the day.
Although the Wollongong investigation was one of ICAC’s triumphs, by no
means everyone was satisfied with the outcome. WAC organised a one-day
conference on 16 August 2008 with the theme “Making community democracy
work” (Apap 2008, 18 August). Keynote speaker John Hatton, a former member of
state parliament — elected as an independent, not affiliated with any political party —
and noted anti-corruption campaigner, declaimed against ICAC’s shortcomings in not
tackling systemic corruption. Hatton facilitated a discussion at the conference at
which one person after another complained about ICAC for not initiating
investigations despite complaints made to it.
Many WAC members decried both the shortcomings of ICAC in restraining a
wider exposure of corruption and the imposition of administrators as preventing an
expansion of citizen participation. Believing ICAC’s terms of reference were too
narrow, a central demand by WAC was for a royal commission into corruption,
looking for inspiration to a few crusading commissions such as the Fitzgerald Inquiry
in Queensland. In other words, WAC both criticised and challenged one official
channel, the ICAC inquiry, and advocated a different potential official channel, a
royal commission. As noted earlier, royal commissions and other major governmentinitiated inquiries usually — but not always — serve government agendas and
dampen citizen outrage. In practice, WAC’s call for a royal commission seems mainly
to have served a rhetorical purpose: the state Labor government was never likely to
set up an independent and probing investigation into corruption given the number of
key Labor figures likely to be implicated.
Community mobilisation is a powerful challenge to entrenched corruption. In
tactical terms, civic coalitions can harness sources of information that expose
problems, cutting through methods of cover-up, thereby gaining more support.
Through popular participation of a broad cross-section of the community, they
validate their own cause and counter techniques of devaluation. They can articulate
the demand for honest governance, challenging corruption-tolerant interpretations.
They are an alternative to official channels. Finally, through their numbers and
prominence, they can help in resisting intimidation.
27

Resistance Studies Magazine 2012-01

From: rsmag.org

There are a number of episodes of popular mobilisation linked to challenging
corruption on a national scale, for example the 1986 people power movement in the
Philippines that ended the corrupt rule of President Ferdinand Marcos, the 1997
campaign in Turkey by the Citizen Initiative for Constant Light, and the Egyptian
groups Shayfeen.com, formed in 2005, and its successor Egyptians Against
Corruption (Beyerle 2011; Beyerle and Hassan 2009). The activities of ROC and
WAC show the possibilities for popular mobilisation to challenge local corruption.
The usual approaches to corruption rely on institutional power, such as market
mechanisms and government regulations; ICAC is an example of such institutional
anti-corruption power. ROC and WAC, as well as examples from other countries,
show that by harnessing popular participation there is the potential for a different
source of power against corruption: civic power. Citizens can wield this power
directly as well as seeking to activate institutional power.

Intimidation and bribery
Corrupt operators often attempt to reduce opposition through a combination of threats,
attacks and reprisals on the one hand and incentives on the other. In ruthless criminal
operations, intimidation includes bombings, beatings and killings, including attacks
on family members. Lesser forms of intimidation include threats, bullying, damage to
property, and petty harassment. Bribery can include payments in cash or various
possibilities in kind including watches, cars, travel, scholarships, club memberships,
promotions and jobs. After someone is introduced to criminal operations, the
possibilities of intimidation increase: someone who has participated in a beating can
be set up for arrest.
Intimidation, by causing fear, reduces the potential for popular action,
sometimes by discouraging open opposition to corruption and sometimes by helping
hide what is going on: intimidation has a close link with cover-up. Bribery encourages
those closest to the action to join in or keep quiet in the hope of benefits.
In the Wollongong corruption scandal, there are no reports of murder:
intimidation did not take more extreme forms. Instead, it mainly involved pressure to
approve DAs, or otherwise do what was expected from higher up, with an
accompanying fear of losing one’s job. The other main form was bullying.
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Beth Morgan testified that General Manager Rod Oxley put pressure on staff
to do what he wanted: “Personally I felt that you either had to do what Rod wanted on
a DA, and generally that was to approve it. If not, either he would make the decision,
which he had done — has done on other occasions when staff had wanted to — when
I and other staff had wanted to refuse applications, that you either went along with
that, or else your career was effectively over at Wollongong City Council and he did
the best he could and got rid of you” (54–55).
Morgan eventually decided to tell the truth to ICAC, even though she felt
frightened (162). She had good reason to feel this way: it was dramatically revealed at
the hearings that Vellar asked Younan to threaten Morgan, essentially to prevent her
speaking out (631–633; McInerney 2008, 28 February): Morgan hadn’t previously
known about this action by her former lover Vellar. Morgan also felt threatened by
Scimone (166), against whom there were several bullying complaints (485–486;
Trenwith 2008, 27 February).
Others besides Morgan had raised concerns about Oxley’s role. Planner Mike
Mouritz had written that he resigned because of Oxley’s interference (189). Planner
David Broyd left because of interference and a “clash of values” (379, 393; Cox 2008,
23 February). Planner John Gilbert said he felt his job was at risk (406) and that
Oxley’s pressure was a source of staff turnover (407): he himself considered leaving,
in part because of Oxley (472). (For Oxley’s perspective, see East (2009).)
ICAC interviewed relatively few individuals; it is reasonable to presume that
many other council workers could have given similar stories of interference and
bullying. In all these examples, pressure was exerted inside council, with job security,
promotion prospects and job satisfaction being prime vulnerabilities for those
affected.
Perhaps the word “intimidation” is too strong to describe some of the
pressures that workers experienced. For some, it might better be described as a choice
between going along with the flow and having working life become more difficult —
and exceedingly stressful.
It is usually very hard to obtain information about the forms and extent of
intimidation, because those targeted often legitimately fear that by speaking out they
would become subject to further attacks — as happened to Morgan. In this way also,
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intimidation and cover-up are linked. One of the most potent ways to challenge
intimidation is to expose it.
According to a news story, councillor Andrew Anthony wrote to ICAC saying
“that he had been the subject of repeated threats from Labor councillors and that he
feared for his safety” (McInerney 2008, 7 March). (ICAC replied that this should be
treated as a disciplinary matter using the council’s code of conduct.) After the ICAC
hearings, Anthony went public about the threats.
Some members of WAC received death threats in the post. This worried them,
to say the least, but they were not deterred from their efforts. An additional response
would have been to put images of the threat letters on the WAC website. Exposing
intimidation can serve to generate greater support.

Conclusion
The Wollongong saga reveals tactics used by those implicated in corrupt operations
and tactics used by opponents of corruption. To minimise public outrage, perpetrators
used cover-up, devaluation, reinterpretation, intimidation and bribery. The other tactic
commonly used by powerful perpetrators, official channels, was not at the formal
disposal of the corrupt operators. Indeed, the investigation and hearings by an official
body, the Independent Commission Against Corruption, broke open the case. Even so,
both ICAC and the state government acted to prevent expanding the anti-corruption
campaign more widely. Neither took any action to encourage mobilisation of citizen
groups against corruption.
Nevertheless, the ICAC exposures combined with extensive media coverage
stimulated the formation of one local group, Reclaim Our City, and gave tremendous
impetus to the already-formed group Wollongong Against Corruption. The efforts of
ICAC, the media and these groups illustrate methods of increasing outrage by
opposing the five outrage-minimisation methods, namely by exposure of the problem,
validation of targets, interpretation of activities as corrupt, mobilisation of support
without reliance on official channels, and resisting intimidation and bribery.
Corrupt operators sometimes have supporters throughout the highest reaches
of society, in what can be called institutionalised corruption, and can use all five
methods of inhibiting outrage. In smaller-scale local corruption, such as at
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Wollongong, operators do not have such easy support from above, which means they
cannot so easily use the methods of devaluation and reinterpretation. In such cases,
corruption is officially illegal and condemned. Cover-up becomes a prime method,
devaluation is mainly restricted to those close to the action, reinterpretation has to
occur within codes that are publicly acceptable, official channels become a doubleedged sword and intimidation and bribery have to be targeted, otherwise they may be
counterproductive. These features are apparent in the Wollongong case: cover-up was
crucial to continuation of operations; devaluation was limited in extent;
reinterpretation took place within the rhetoric of supporting development; one official
channel, ICAC, helped break open the case but also limited its expansion, while
another official channel, the state government, tried to limit political damage from the
exposures; and intimidation and bribery were narrowly targeted, with the wider public
not being directly affected.
When serious corruption occurs, citizen mobilisation is a powerful antidote.
Looking at ways to expand this mobilisation provides a recipe for action. This leads
directly to the five methods of increasing outrage.
Analysing tactics also provides a way of judging the seriousness of corruption.
When operators rely primarily on cover-up and can be brought to account through
exposure, the corruption is not entrenched. On the other hand, when anti-corruption
campaigners are publicly denigrated and physically attacked and when official
agencies go through the motions but do not make serious inroads against corrupt
operations, the corruption is more institutionalised.
The normal inclination of governments is to maintain control of anticorruption efforts, using laws, police and various agencies. Yet, all too often, these
efforts are inadequate and become implicated in corruption themselves. A mobilised
public is a powerful anti-corruption force. For citizen activists, paying attention to the
tactics for increasing outrage can be a useful framework for guiding campaigns.

Postscript
In 2008, the state government dismissed the entire elected Wollongong Council and
installed three administrators instead, to run things until the next election. Before
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leaving their jobs, the administrators established detailed policies to prevent a
recurrence of corruption (Grennan 2011).
Elections were scheduled for 3 September 2011, with a new voting system to
elect 13 councillors: four councillors elected from each of three wards, with the lord
mayor elected separately by the entire electorate. Each of the three largest national
political parties, Liberals, Labor and Greens, put up candidates. There were also
numerous independent candidates. A total of 83 candidates ran for the 13 positions,
with an optional preferential ballot system.
One candidate for lord mayor was of special significance: Rod Oxley,
previously general manager of Wollongong Council. ICAC found that Oxley had
allowed corruption to occur but did not recommend that he be charged with any
offence. Oxley defended his actions and reputation in a book titled Named and
Shamed (East, 2009). His run for lord mayor was interpreted by some as a further
attempt to overcome the stigma of corruption.
If so, he was spectacularly unsuccessful. Though more widely known than
most of the other candidates, he received less than 3% of the primary vote. Indeed,
voters seemed to prefer candidates with no connection to the previous council. Two
members of the previous elected council, Alice Cartan and Andrew Anthony — who
had not been implicated in corruption — received few first-preference votes for lord
mayor. The winner was an independent candidate, Gordon Bradbery, a popular
minister in the Uniting Church, known for his stands on social justice. However, in
the ward elections, voters mainly supported the three major parties, with independents
faring poorly. One exception was Vicki Curran, a key figure in Wollongong Against
Corruption, who was elected as an independent.
During the election campaign, there was much comment about the corruption
scandal, in part stimulated by news concerning its central figures. A month before the
election date, the Director of Public Prosecutions announced that planner Beth
Morgan would not be charged over 24 of 27 matters recommended by ICAC; three
matters remained outstanding (Tonkin 2011, 2 August). Developer Frank Vellar was
found guilty of three charges and given a two-year good behaviour bond concerning
two of them, with a decision on a fourth charge deferred (Tonkin 2011, 27 August).
ICAC (2011) posts on its website the status of its recommendations for prosecution.
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Just across the street from Wollongong’s Council building, where some of the
central events in the corruption scandal occurred, sits the Illawarra Performing Arts
Centre (IPAC). Merrigong Theatre Company — which manages IPAC — worked in
conjunction with another company, Version 1.0, to produce a play about the events. It
was titled “The Table of Knowledge” after the table, outside a kebab shop in
Wollongong, where key figures in the drama — including Oxley, Morgan and Vellar
— had met.
To avoid being sued for defamation, the play was ingeniously built around text
from public documents, including ICAC transcripts and Oxley’s book. By
coincidence, the play opened a couple of days before the election. It was well received
by audiences and reviewers (Shand 2011; Skinner 2011).
At the beginning of the play, an actor says to the audience, repeatedly, “This is
a very unique story, the kind of story that could only ever take place in a place like
Wollongong.” Each time, another actor cried out “Strathfield” or “Burwood” or the
name of some other Australian local government body where corruption had been
exposed. The message was clear: this was a story about Wollongong but it could just
as well have been about any number of other places. For the same reason, this
analysis of corruption tactics is a Wollongong story but has many general lessons for
dealing with corruption.

Appendix 1: Key figures
Staff at Wollongong Council
Beth Morgan, senior planner. She admitted to having affairs with developers Frank
Vellar, Glen Tabak and Michael Kollaras when she was handling their DAs
John Gilbert, planner. Beth Morgan’s supervisor
David Broyd, planner. He left Council in 2005. Critical of pressure from Rod Oxley
Joe Scimone, manager. Accused of sexual harassment. Left Council for a job with the
NSW Maritime Authority
Rod Oxley, general manager, in charge of the DA process
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Councillors (elected local government members)
Val Zanotto, Kiril Jonovski, Zeki Esen and Frank Gigliotti, Labor Party members
named as persons of interest by ICAC

State government
Morris Iemma, premier of NSW
David Campbell, member of state parliament representing the electorate of Keira (in
Wollongong); Police Minister in the state government; former Wollongong
councillor and Lord Mayor
Noreen Hay, member of state parliament representing the electorate of Wollongong

Developers
Frank Vellar
Glen Tabak
Michael Kollaras

Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC)
Jerrold Cripps, Commissioner. Presided over the Wollongong Council hearings
Noel Hemmings, lawyer, who did most of the questioning in ICAC hearings

Others
Ray Younan and Gerald Carroll, convicted criminals who posed as ICAC personnel

Appendix 2: The allegations
Several types of corrupt or inappropriate conduct were alleged to have occurred in
Wollongong. For ICAC’s findings and recommendations see ICAC (2008b).

Conflict of interest
The most dramatic instances were Beth Morgan’s affairs with developers while she
was assessing their DAs.
Another example was general manager Rod Oxley meeting with developers —
notably Frank Vellar — outside of his office, in violation of Council policies. When
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Council planners rejected Vellar’s DAs, he would go to Oxley who would follow up
with managers.
Councillor Val Zanotto made money out of a purchase of land while he was
part of the council decision-making process.

Interference with procedures
Oxley was alleged to interfere with processes for handling DAs, usually to push
through what he thought was a desirable project.

Violation of procedures
Morgan approved a DA although it greatly exceeded planning guidelines for height
and floor-space ratio.

Releasing confidential information
Morgan gave Vellar internal council documents, at his request. After Vellar received
confidential rezoning information, he made an unconditional offer on property the
same day.

Bribery
Vellar gave Morgan — while she was assessing his DA — many gifts.
Vellar claimed that three councillors had solicited a cash bribe in return for
supporting his DA.
A number of individuals — among them Vellar, Morgan, Scimone and Zanotto
— paid Younan and Carroll a total of half a million dollars to avoid being named in
ICAC investigations.

Favours
Scimone overruled his staff in giving Tabak, a friend, a $200,000 reduction in a
council fee.

Donations
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Companies and individuals made donations to politicians. For example, developer
Tabak made donations to state politician Noreen Hay, to the Labor Party and to the
Liberal Party, among others. Donations are legal but can lead to an expectation or
perception that favours may be done in return for them.

Caucusing
The Labor Party uses a caucus system: Labor members of council, meeting separately,
decided on a position, after which all members were bound to support the position in
the full council meeting. This meant that four Labor councillors could control the
council: if they voted as a bloc in the Labor caucus, the other three Labor members
would have to support the decision, and the seven-member Labor group then had a
majority of the 13 councillors. Noel Hemmings of ICAC argued that caucusing this
way was a form of corruption (868; McInerney 2008, 4 March).
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